“The New Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives and the Problem of Fiscal Sustainability After the Crisis.” by Biraschi Paolo et al.
 
 
 Working Papers 
N°8 – October 2010 
Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Department of the Treasury 
“The New Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives 
and the Problem of Fiscal Sustainability After 
the Crisis.” 
  Paolo Biraschi, Marco Cacciotti, Davide Iacovoni and Juan Pradelli 
 
ISSN 1972-411X  
 
Working Papers 
The working paper series promotes the dissemination of economic research produced in 
the Department of the Treasury (DT) of the Italian  Ministry of Economy  and  Finance 
(MEF) or presented by external economists on the occasion of seminars organised by 
MEF on topics of institutional interest to the DT, with the aim of stimulating comments 
and suggestions. 
The  views  expressed  in  the  working  papers  are  those  of  the  authors  and  do  not 
necessarily reflect those of the MEF and the DT. 
Copyright:  © 
2010, Paolo Biraschi, Marco Cacciotti, Davide Iacovoni, and Juan 
Pradelli 
 
The document can be downloaded from the Website www.dt.tesoro.it and freely 
used, providing that its source and author(s) are quoted. 
 
Editorial Board: Lorenzo Codogno, Mauro Marè, Libero Monteforte, Francesco Nucci, Franco Peracchi 
Organisational coordination: Marina Sabatini  




“The New Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives 
and the Problem of Fiscal Sustainability After the 
Crisis.”1 
 
Paolo Biraschi(*), Marco Cacciotti(*), Davide Iacovoni(*) and Juan Pradelli(**)  
 
Abstract 
The  paper  analyses  the  medium-term  objectives  (MTOs)  recently  adopted  by  the  EU 
Member States as a reference for the multilateral budgetary surveillance, assessing the ability 
of  the  new  MTOs  to  promote  long-term  fiscal  sustainability.  The  paper  calibrates  the  (yet 
undisclosed)  algorithm  for  computing  the  minimum  budgetary  targets  that  EU  countries  can 
declare  as  MTO  and  discusses  two  novel  features  of  the  algorithm:  a  supplementary  debt-
reduction effort requested from high-debt countries, and the partial frontloading of the expected 
future increases in age-related expenditure -the cost of ageing-. The paper evaluates the impact 
of the crisis on EU countries‟ current as well as future MTOs through the channels of higher 
public  debt,  lower  growth  potential,  and  higher  cost  of  ageing.  On  the  basis  of  alternative 
scenarios for macroeconomic and budgetary conditions as of 2012 -when the next revision of 
MTOs is scheduled-, the paper concludes that prospective MTOs would be more stringent than 
the current ones. Therefore, a path for gradual fiscal tightening is already embedded into the 
European fiscal framework and should be considered when discussing exit strategies. Finally, 
an alternative indicator linking MTOs to the current fiscal and financial imbalances is presented. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) agreed upon at the European Council of 
March 2005, introduced a number of relevant amendments to both the preventive and corrective 
arm of the EU fiscal framework. In particular, a new definition of the medium-term objectives 
(MTOs), which are part of the preventive arm and inform the EU multilateral budgetary and 
macroeconomic surveillance, was incorporated in the Stability and Convergence Programmes 
(SCPs) and their assessment by the European Commission. 
  
EU  Member  States‟  SCPs  indicate  MTOs  for  budget  balances  in  structural  terms,  i.e. 
cyclically-adjusted and net of one-off and temporary measures. The revised SGP establishes 
that MTOs may be country-specific, depending on national macroeconomic and public finances 
conditions  and  having  regard  to  risks  to  long-term  sustainability  of  public  finances.  General 
criteria  for  determining  the  medium-term  budgetary  targets  were  agreed  by  the  European 
Council, e.g. MTOs have to consider the government debt, the potential output growth, and a 
safety margin with respect to the Maastricht limit of 3 percent of GDP for the nominal budget 
deficit. Eventually, the ECOFIN Council‟s assessment of SCPs addresses whether the MTOs 
declared by EU Member States do satisfy the agreed criteria. 
 
Initially,  the  revised  SGP  did  not  provide  a  well-defined  rule  or  methodology  for 
implementing the MTO determination criteria. Large room for judgmental analysis was then left 
to each Member State when setting budgetary targets and this represented a potential flaw to 
the overall credibility of the EU fiscal framework. As recently as 2009, however, Member States 
and the European Commission completed a joint work elaborating a methodology for computing 
MTOs that renders operational the MTO determination criteria.
2 The methodology encompasses 
not only public debt, potential growth, and budgetary safety margins, but also the implicit 
government liabilities associated with rising expe nditure due to ageing populations. Two novel 
features are incorporated in the quantitative determination of MTOs: a supplementary debt -
reduction effort -required from EU countries whose debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the Maastricht 60 
per cent reference value -  aimed at promoting convergence of debt ratios towards prudent 
levels; and a partial frontloading of cost of ageing  -requested from all EU countries indistinctly- 
that seeks to cover part of the future increases in age-related spending-.
3  
 
A final agreement on the MTO methodology has been introduced in the Code of Conduct 
(CoC, 2009) that specifies the practical implementation of several aspects of the SGP.  In the 
2009  updates  of  SCP,  15  EU  countries  have  declared  MTOs  calculated  using  the  new 
methodology. However, neither they nor the European Commission have ever disclosed the 
                                                       
2 More precisely, the work establishes modalities for computing country-specific minimum budgetary targets that Member States 
can declare as MTOs. Countries are indeed free to declare MTOs more demanding than those minimum targets.  
3 Implicit government liabilities constitute unfunded commitments that are not necessarily backed by law or contractual obligations, 
but rather grounded in strong expectations by the public, e.g. pension expenditure or liabilities arising in connection with support to 
the financial sector in times of crisis.  




specific algorithm for computing MTOs, including the aforementioned two novel features.  
 
Following the economic crisis, financial bailouts, and fiscal stimulus packages, the public 
finances  in  all  EU  countries  have  significantly  deteriorated  since  2008.  Nowadays,  in  fact, 
issues  of  fiscal  sustainability  and  implicit  liabilities  are  growing  concerns.  Not  only  are 
governments  under  pressure  to  design  fiscal  exit  strategies  aimed  at  reversing  the 
expansionary stance deployed in 2008-2009, but they have also to cope with the higher levels 
of explicit liabilities inherited from the crisis as well as with the more proximate dates at which 
age-related  expenditures  will  engage  in  a  growing  trajectory.  Most  EU  Member  States,  in 
particular, are under the excessive deficit procedure and should implement fiscal adjustments 
since 2011.  
 
In this context, the current MTOs could potentially play a role as part of the exit strategies. 
Being  a  formal  and  explicit  constraint  on  fiscal  policies  in  terms  of  medium-term  budgetary 
outcomes, MTOs could help in planning a gradual reversal of expansionary stimulus.
4  More 
importantly, MTOs would facilitate coping with the problems of high debt and ageing -related 
implicit liabilities by requesting additional public savings through the supplementary debt -
reduction effort and the partial front-loading of cost of ageing. 
  
There is a risk, however, that economic recovery falters because fiscal tightening starts too 
early and attempts to adjust too much. In this regard, the current MTOs that many EU countries 
have declared in the 2009 updates of SCP are excessively demanding and imply unrealistically -
large budgetary consolidation efforts going forward. Credibility is  an issue in this context. In 
addition, if consolidation is attempted despite of a weak recovery, MTOs could even end up 
being contractive. While some consequences of the crisis are apparent, like the sharp increase 
in public debt, others are still uncertain, like the impact on long-run growth potential and cost of 
ageing. Under changing conditions, the prospective MTOs will probably be more stringent than 
the current ones and exacerbate the credibility problem. 
 
Against this background, the aim of the paper  is threefold. First, to analyze the new MTO 
methodology and discuss critical aspects of the modalities to take on board government 
liabilities. Second, to assess the impact of the crisis on the current and future MTOs, showing 
the incidence of debt, growt h, and cost of ageing on the budgetary targets that EU Member 
States are committed to achieve. Third, noticing that the new MTO methodology focuses on a 
handful of fiscal and growth variables and thus leaves aside other important determinants of the 
sustainability of public finances, the paper outlines a simple alternative modality to introduce 
into the MTOs several factors bearing on the fiscal risk associated to any level of public debt. 
The proposed modality considers the composition of public debt by maturity, the structure of the 
private sector indebtedness, and financial market judgements. 
 
                                                       
4 Consolidation ought to be gradual because in the current context of low interest rates and loose monetary policy, fiscal multipliers 
are high and therefore a sudden fiscal adjustment will lead to a large output contraction. Committing governments to fiscal plans 
beyond normal electoral cycles is difficult. But the EU is better placed to cope with these credibility issues as supra-national 
arrangements like fiscal rules can be established and must be observed by national governments in single countries despite of their 
short-term political objectives.    




The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional framework of the 
new MTO methodology. Section 3 explores the analytical underpinnings of MTOs, conducts a 
calibration  exercise  to  uncover  the  (yet  undisclosed)  algorithm  for  computing  MTOs,  and 
provides a critical assessment on the implications on fiscal sustainability of the supplementary 
debt-reduction effort and the frontloading of cost of ageing. Section 4 assesses the impact of 
the  financial  and  economic  crisis  on  EU  Member  States‟  MTOs  and  distinguishes  between 
direct  and  indirect  effects  associated,  respectively,  to  higher  debt  levels  and  lower  growth 
potential. Section 5 elaborates an alternative modality for determining MTOs that replaces the 
supplementary  debt-reduction  effort  by  a  synthetic  exposure  index  that  measures  funding 
pressures and risks facing all sectors in a given country at a certain point in time. The index 
includes variables related to the short-term sustainability of public debt, the risk of distress in the 
financial and banking system, and the build-up of sectoral and external imbalances. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2  INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW MTO METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The  legal  basis  of  the  new  MTO methodology  is  found  in  the  Conclusions  of  the  2005 
Spring Council of the European Union (2005a), which defined the main economic principles of 
the SGP reform and ensured the required political commitment to make the endorsement of the 
European fiscal framework fully credible.
5 
 
Given the previous failures to reach MTOs from the large majority of EU Member States, 
the European Council sought to strengthen the SGP preventive arm by allowing MTOs for 
structural budget balances to be cou ntry-specific and to take into account differences across 
countries in their economic fundamentals and risks to public -finance sustainability  -especially 
risks associated with demographic changes -. This innovative perspective contrasted sharply 
with the previous version of SGP, which had adopted a one-rule-fits-all approach and requested 
EU Member States to achieve indistinctly a medium-term budgetary position close to balance or 
in surplus regardless of their specific economic conditions. 
 
MTO differentiation, in turn, had to consider the countries‟ government debt and implicit 
liabilities  –especially  those  associated  with  rising  age-related  expenditure-,  potential  growth, 
and a safety margin minimizing chances of having budget deficits breaching the Maastricht 3 
percent reference value. In addition, the importance of fiscal soundness for monetary stability in 
a currency union warranted further differentiation by membership to the Euro Area and ERM II. 
Thus, Member States adopting the Euro, or in the process of doing it, were requested to declare 
MTOs in a range between a structural deficit of 1 per cent of GDP -for low debt/high potential 
growth countries- and a balanced or in-surplus structural budgetary position -for high debt/low 
                                                       
5 For details, see European Commission (2005, p.79-100; 2006, p.88-109).  




potential growth countries-. 
 
Along with the principle of MTO differentiation, the European Council made explicit a triple 
aim  pursued  by  MTOs:  (i)  providing  the  aforementioned  safety  margin,  (ii)  ensuring  rapid 
progress  towards  public-finance  sustainability;  and  (iii)  allowing  an  appropriate  budgetary 
margin of manoeuvre to support public investment. This triple aim suggested that MTOs would 
facilitate the use of fiscal policies for short-run stabilization purposes -as it had been necessary 
during 2001-2002-, but would also seek preservation of fiscal soundness in the long run. 
 
General criteria for the quantitative determination of country-specific MTOs transpired from 
the triple aim as well as from the broad goals of the SGP reform. For instance, in order to 
safeguard the long-term sustainability of public finances, MTO values for the structural budget 
balance  should  ensure  the  convergence  of  debt  ratios  towards  prudent  levels  and  the 
frontloading of implicit liabilities associated with ageing populations. MTO determination criteria 
were, nevertheless, too general and even the European Council acknowledged that modalities 
for implementing and operationalizing them had to be carefully elaborated.
6 
 
Towards a methodology for implementing MTO determination criteria  
 
The  consideration  of  public  debt  and  implicit  liabilities  in  the  determination  of  country-
specific  MTOs  raised  a  number  of  conceptual  and  methodological  issues.  The  main  open 
questions referred to which indicators of government liabilities should be used (stock vs flow 
measures)  and  which  definition  of  implicit  liabilities  should  be  adopted  (broad  vs  narrow 
definition, backward- vs forward-looking notions, inclusive or not of contingent liabilities such as 
financial bailouts). The European Council then deemed that further technical work was needed 
in order to make the aim related to the rapid improvement of fiscal sustainability fully operational. 
Nevertheless, in order to proceed immediately with the application of the MTO differentiation 
principle, it established a transitory period in which MTOs would be determined on the sole 
basis of the government debt-to-GDP ratio, potential growth, and the budgetary safety margin, 
leaving implicit liabilities aside for the time being. 
 
At  this  stage,  a  major  problem  with  methodological  and  political  implication  arose:  no 
clarifications were given by the European Council on how to combine the information on public 
                                                       
6 The European Council also agreed on general criteria for modulating the adjustment path towards the 
achievement of MTOs. These criteria ensured continuity and opportunity of the budgetary consolidation 
efforts that Member States should undertake if their current fiscal positions were far from MTOs. For 
instance, in countries belonging to Euro Area and ERM II, the annual improvement in the structural 
budget balance had to be at least 0.5 percentage points of GDP. For all EU countries in need of 
consolidation, besides, the opportunity for budgetary improvements became an important issue. The 
European Council introduced a symmetrical approach to fiscal policy over the cycle by requiring 
countries to enhance fiscal discipline in „good times‟ –defined as periods when output exceeds its 
potential level-, while allowing them to accommodate „bad times‟ –characterized by a negative output 
gap-. Temporary deviations from admissible MTOs or adjustment paths would be allowed for if arising as 
short-term effects of implementing structural reforms. 
  




debt, potential growth, and safety margin to calculate the country-specific MTOs. Hence, there 
were  no  indications  on  the  hierarchical  order  to  be  attached  to  these  three  variables  in 
determining MTOs. The European Commission view was that more weight should be given to 
the current level of government debt and the prospects of potential growth. In this regard, the 
European Commission was particularly concerned because the European Council Conclusions 
did not make a straightforward reference on the necessity of setting MTO values –based on 
debt and growth- that should be much more demanding than those values that would just cover 
the budgetary safety margin. It was then convinced that leaving Member States free to set their 
MTOs –with the risk of having them covering just the safety margins- could be in conflict with 
the aim of preserving fiscal sustainability and, in addition, could undermine the credibility of the 
overall  EU fiscal framework. After negotiations, the  European Commission and the  Member 




Over the transition period, the conceptual and methodological issues involved in the new 
approach to gauge MTOs were addressed by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), 
the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), and the Ageing Working Group (AWG). Several 
proposals were considered, exploring different modalities to combine the variables relevant for 
determining MTOs in a well -defined quantitative framework .
8 The final agreement on the 
implementation of MTO determination criteria was achieved in the Spring 2009 and officially 
came into force in November 2009 with the introduction of the corresponding provisions in the 
CoC. For the first time 15 EU Member States have declared MTOs computed using the new 
methodology  in  their  2009  updates  of  SCP.  However,  neither  they  nor  the  Europ ean 
Commission have ever disclosed the specific algorithm for computing MTOs. 
3  ANALYTICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE NEW MTO 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Nature, purpose, and the determination of MTO 
The MTO is a quantitative target for the structural budget balance that an EU Member 
State commits itself to achieve over a certain time horizon, usually the planning horizon of the 
SCP. The MTO should therefore constrain the country‟s fiscal policies to eventually deliver an 
overall  budget  balance  -adjusted  by  cyclical  fluctuations,  net  of  one-offs  and  temporary 
measures, and expressed as percentage of GDP- that meets the target or improves upon it.
9 
                                                       
7A number of arguments were advanced to justify such decision: the current debt ratio is an observed variable and does not rely on 
assumptions, while estimates for long-term potential growth are uncertain and may fluctuate substantially in the short term; and the 
current debt ratio is one of the main indicators for assessing public-finance sustainability at any possible time horizon. 
8 For details on the proposals, see European Commission (2007, p.91-95; 2008, p.106-110). Highly disputed issues concerned the 
indicators of implicit liabilities to be used and the need of setting MTOs that would neither penalize countries that had implemented 
pension reforms nor discourage those that had reforms in the pipeline 
9 Policies leading to the achievement of MTO, in addition, must satisfy other constraints requiring the path of budgetary adjustment 
to be gradual, without exhibiting sudden, large, and possibly politically-unfeasible consolidations near the end of the planning 
horizon. For instance, a country running a structural deficit far away from the MTO is committed to improve the structural budget  




Being a formal constraint on fiscal policies in terms of medium-term budgetary outcomes, the 
quantitative  determination  of  country-specific  MTOs  has  always  been  a  politically-sensitive 
issue subject to negotiations, agreement, and institutional arrangements. As indicated in section 
2, MTO was given a triple aim that largely shapes the MTO determination criteria. 
 
First, the MTO intends to provide a safety margin against the possibility that, given an 
unexpected worsening of economic conditions, the nominal budget deficit suddenly rises and 
exceeds the Maastricht 3 percent of GDP reference value. This notion underpins the country-
specific MTO minimum benchmark, calculated using a country‟s sensitivity of budget balance to 
output gap together with an estimate of output volatility –e.g. the extreme (negative) value of the 
country‟s output gap that might occur in the future with a certain probability-10. Thus, a country 
whose budget balance is more (less) sensitive to cyclical fluctuations -probably as a result of 
institutional  arrangements  concerning  the  operation  of  automatic  stabilisers-  should  be 
committed to a more (less) demanding MTO and therefore to a tighter (looser) medium-term 
target  for  the  structural  budget  balance.  A  similar  commitment  is  expected  from  a  country 
exhibiting a business cycle with large (small) output movements since an unexpected, large 
drop in economic activity is more likely (unlikely) to occur, dragging down the budget balance. 
 
Second, the MTO aims to ensure progress towards sustainability of public finances, 
defined broadly to include both the explicit liabilities corresponding to the current stock of debt 
and the implicit liabilities associated with the expected deterioration of fiscal balances due to 
rising age-related expenditure induced by demographic trends (i.e. the cost of ageing).  
 
As far as sustainability of explicit liabilities is concerned, the MTO seeks convergence of 
high debt levels towards the Maastricht 60 percent of GDP reference value. Thus, a country 
whose  debt-to-GDP  ratio  is  above  (below)  that  threshold  should  pursue  a  more  (less) 
demanding MTO, as well as a country having low (high) prospective growth rates of potential 
GDP. High-debt and low-growth countries would then seek to achieve a stronger fiscal position 
leading  to  debt  growth  below  nominal  GDP  growth,  eventually  converging  to  the  Maastricht 
reference value.  
 
With  respect  to  sustainability  of  implicit  liabilities,  the  MTO  aims  at  the  partial 
frontloading of the cost of ageing. Such a frontloading requires a country to improve budget 
balances  and  increase  public  savings  in  the  present  (hence  reducing  the  pace  of  debt 
accumulation  or  even  increasing  assets),  so  that  it  makes  additional  financial  resources 
available in the future (under the form of a lower debt burden or even a higher stock of assets) 
to  cope  better  with  the  increase  in  age-related  expenditure  when  it  eventually  kicks-in. 
According to this notion, a more (less) demanding MTO is therefore expected from a country 
facing a high (low) cost of ageing or is willing to frontload a larger (smaller) proportion of that 
cost. 
 
Third, the MTO allows for room of manoeuvre for a country that chooses to undertake 
public investment as a means to support aggregate demand or to promote economic growth. In 
particular, a low-debt country is granted a less demanding MTO so that its fiscal budget can 
accommodate additional investment spending without failing to fulfil the committed MTO. 
 
For the purpose of this section, we presume that the MTO determination criteria are 
being implemented by  a formal rule or algorithm that sets a minimum value for the MTO a 
country can declare and commit to achieve (i.e. a minimum budgetary target the country must 
go for). In fact, the CoC explicitly gives freedom to all EU countries to commit themselves to 
                                                                                                                                                             
balance each year until reaching the MTO by an amount of (at least) 0.5 percentage points of GDP. This ensures that budgetary 
consolidation starts early in time and constitutes a rather continuous process. 
10 For details, see European Commission (2007, p.104-107) and Codogno and Nucci (2007).  




more ambitious targets than those implied by the MTO determination criteria, „as if‟ there was a 
formal rule for implementing them.
11  
 
In the 2009 updates of SCP, 15 EU countrie s have declared the MTOs that result from 
implementing the MTO determination criteria as agreed in Spring 2009. But they have not 
disclosed the MTO methodology underlying their committed budgetary targets. In the next part 
of this section, we attempt to uncover that algorithm on the basis of the CoC statements, official 
publications by the European Commission, some pieces of information collected from the 2009 
updates of SCP, a few assumptions concerning the algorithm specification, and the countries‟ 
declared MTOs following the new methodology. 
 
3.2  A calibrated model for the MTO determination 
From an analytical point of view, the algorithm implementing the MTO determination 
criteria loads as input the fiscal and macroeconomic variables relevant for the MTO triple aim, 
and  delivers  as  output  the  minimum  budgetary  target  that  a  country  can  go  for.  Given  the 
minimum  target  resulting  from  the  algorithm  (hereinafter  denoted  MTOMT),  a  country  must 
commit to achieve an MTO (denoted MTOD, with D standing for „declared‟) that is equal or 
more  demanding  than  that minimum. While  MTOD  is  observed,  MTOMT  is  not,  but  it  must 
satisfy MTOMT ≤ MTOD. 
 
To  uncover  the  MTOMT  algorithm,  we  follow  closely  the  CoC  statements  on  the 
matter.
12  Our reading of the CoC suggests the MTOMT mu st be the most demanding value 
among three alternatives: (i) the country -specific MTO minimum benchmark (MTOMB), which 
constitutes the aforementioned safety margin and whose value has been already disclosed by 
the European Commission (2007, p.107); (ii) the country-specific commitment by participants of 
Euro Area and ERM II to achieve at least a structural deficit of 1 percent of GDP (MTOEA); and 
(iii) the country-specific MTO that addresses the issues of sustainability of public finances and 
budgetary manoeuvre granted to low-debt countries (MTOSM, with S standing for „sustainability‟ 
and M for „manoeuvre‟). Hence, for country i the algorithm states  
 
(1)     MTOMTi = Max (MTOMBi, MTOEAi, MTOSMi) 
 
with MTOEAi being -1 if country i belongs to Euro Area or ERM II and 0 otherwise. 
 
The CoC gives some guidance on how to calculate the MTOSM by saying that it should 
encompass three components: (i) the budget balance that stabilises the debt-to-GDP ratio at 60 
percent given a country‟s long-term growth rate of potential GDP; (ii) a supplementary debt-
reduction effort for countries whose debt exceeds 60 percent of GDP; and (iii) a proportion of 
the  adjustment  needed  to  cover  the  present  value  of  the  future  increase  in  age-related 
expenditure  (i.e.  the  cost  of  ageing).  The  precise  algorithm  for  computing  these  three 
components of MTOSM, however, is not disclosed in the CoC but we now attempt to uncover it.  
 
                                                       
11 Countries belonging to the Euro Area and ERM II have indeed made use of that freedom by committing themselves to achieve 
MTOs above a structural deficit of 1 percent of GDP, even when the triple aim of MTO warrants a less demanding level. 
12 The more informative part of the CoC concerning the MTO determination states: “Specifically, the country-specific MTOs should 
take into account three components: i) the debt-stabilising balance for a debt ratio equal to the (60% of GDP) reference value 
(dependent on long-term potential growth), implying room for budgetary manoeuvre for Member States with relatively low debt; ii) 
a supplementary debt-reduction effort for Member States with a debt ratio in excess of the (60% of GDP) reference value, implying 
rapid progress towards it; and iii) a fraction of the adjustment needed to cover the present value of the future increase in age-
related government expenditure. This implies a partial frontloading of the budgetary cost of ageing irrespective of the current level 
of debt. In addition to these criteria, MTOs should provide a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit reference value 
and, for euro area and ERM II Member States, in any case not exceed a deficit of 1% of GDP.” (CoC, 2009, p.4).  




The debt-stabilising balance is a standard result in the analysis of debt dynamics and 
should be computed as -(60 gi)/(1+gi), where gi denotes country i‟s long-term growth rate of 
potential GDP at current prices and is regularly estimated by the Ageing Working Group (AWG) 
for all EU countries.
13 
 
The  adjustment  needed  to  finance  the  country‟s  cost  of  ageing  is  simply  the  S2E 
indicator calculated by the AWG as part of its framework for assessing long-term sustainability 
of public finances.
14  By reading several 2009 updates of SCP, we find evidence that the CoC‟s 
required proportion of this adjustment is either 33 percent of the S2E indicator or the annualized 
value of cost of ageing cumulated until 2040.
15 In the former case, we must use 0.33 S2Ei for 
country i. 
 
The supplementary debt-reduction effort is a novel feature of the MTOSM, with neither 
the literature on debt sustainability nor the  AWG sustainability framework offering an apparent 
counterpart. We therefore must make a specification assumption taking into account the stated 
purpose of the effort, namely to induce convergence of debt -to-GDP ratios in high -debt 
countries towards the Maastricht 60 percent reference value. Accordingly, we specify the effort 
to be proportional to the excess of the debt -to-GDP ratio over and above the 60 percent 
reference value. Hence, we postulate  k (di  - 60) where di is country i‟s debt-to-GDP ratio and 
the parameter k is calibrated below. 
 
Summarizing our discussion, the three components of MTOSM for country i are given 
by  
 
(2)     MTOSMi = -(60 gi)/(1+gi) + k (di - 60) + 0.33 S2Ei . 
 
To calibrate k, we take advantage of the countries‟ MTOs declared in the 2009 updates 
of SCP and proceed guided by an educated guess. Nowadays, high-debt EU countries -which 
would  be  relatively  more  penalized  by  the  supplementary  debt-reduction  effort-  are  likely  to 
prefer having as much fiscal space as possible in order to cope with the crisis and promote the 
recovery. Consequently, it is likely that in the 2009 updates of SCP, they have declared their 
MTOD equal to their minimum budgetary targets MTOMT. By assuming such a case, for a high-
debt country j we can set MTOMTj = MTODj; or alternatively use (1) and (2) to obtain equation 
(3) below.  By  applying equation (3) to a high-debt  country j,  we obtain one equation in the 
unknown parameters k that allows us to calibrate it. 
 
(3)       MTODj = Max (MTOMBj, MTOEAj, -(60 gj)/(1+gj) + k (dj - 60) + 0.33 S2Ej). 
                                                       
13 The CoC itself states: “Potential growth and the budgetary cost of ageing should be assessed in a long-term perspective on the 
basis of the projections produced by the Working Group on Ageing attached to the Economic Policy Committee.” (CoC, 2009, p.4). 
For long term growth projections, see European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2008, 2009). (2008, 2009). 
14 See European Commission (2009b). The S2E indicator measures the permanent adjustment in the structural primary balance-to-
GDP ratio that would allow financing the cost of ageing calculated over an infinite time horizon. It boils down to a weighted 
average of the future increments in age-related spending-to-GDP ratio vis-à-vis the initial ratio, with weightings that depend on 
discounting factors involving future interest and growth rates. S2E depends on the time profile of expected variations in the age-
related expenditure and not on the levels of spending.The CoC itself states: “Potential growth and the budgetary cost of ageing 
should be assessed in a long-term perspective on the basis of the projections produced by the Working Group on Ageing attached to 
the Economic Policy Committee.” (CoC, 2009, p.4). For long term growth projections, see European Commission and Economic 
Policy Committee 
15 Our pieces of evidence are the following. Germany‟s SCP states: “The medium-term objective of -½% of GDP results under both 
possible calculation methods, i.e. whether 33% of the costs as a result of ageing are prefinanced or all costs as a result of ageing 
are covered until 2040.” (p.27). Bulgaria‟s SCP states: “According to the long-term estimates of the Ageing Working Group to the 
EPC at the EC, a structural budget deficit of 1.8% of GDP would satisfy the condition for long-term sustainability of fiscal policy by 
pre-financing 33% of implicit liabilities.” (p.30). Italy‟s SCP states: “With reference to the new methodology for calculating 
Medium Term Objectives (MTO) including implicit liabilities as agreed at the EU level, Italy has opted for the partial front-loading 
of the cost of ageing, in the amount of 33 per cent.” (p.17). Luxembourg‟s SCP states: “Thus, in the case of Luxembourg, a medium 
term budgetary objective of +0.5% of GDP in structural terms with the ensuing budget surpluses should allow providing financially 
for the coverage of the additional public expenditure caused by demographic ageing from here to the 2040 horizon.” (p.10-11).  





At the end of 2008 -the last year for which accurate data are available- Italy was the 
most indebted EU country. In its 2009 update of SCP, Italy  declared MTOD of zero  –i.e. a 
balanced budget in structural term-; since MTOMB is -1.4 and MTOEA is -1, then we assume it 
should have been MTOD=0=MTOMS. Taking on board the values of gj, dj, and S2Ej for Italy 
reported in table 2, the equation solves for the calibrated parameter k = 0.033.  
 
The calibrated algorithm provides us with estimates of MTOMT and MTOSM, denoted 
MTOMT* and MTOSM*. Table 1 reports these estimates for EU countries together with their 
MTOD (if any).  
 
For the 15 countries that did declare MTO, two comparisons between MTOMT* and 
MTOD give us some comfort about the reliability of our estimates in terms of approaching the 
true (undisclosed, unobserved) MTOMT.
16  First, the condition MTOMT ≤ MTOD must always 
hold and we find that our estimates do satisfy MTOMT* ≤ MTOD in 11 out of the 15 countries.
17  
Second, using again an educated guess, a case can be made that countries would prefer either 
to declare MTOD very close to MTOMT –to gain as much fiscal space as possible, as argued 
before- or to declare MTOD well above MTOMT –to signal commitment towards fiscal discipline 
that might bring about gains in terms of market confidence and even financial stability-.
18  MTOD 
being neither close nor far from MTOMT is unlikely to be a preferred option. Our estimates 
MTOMT* indeed reproduce the case made for extreme options: leavin g Luxembourg aside, in 7 
out of 14 countries the MTOMT* differs from MTOD by less than 0.3 percentage points  –
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands-; in 6 countries the discrepancy 
between  MTOMT*  and  MTOD  is  larger  than  1  percentage  point  -Bulgaria,  Estonia,  France, 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden-; and only in Poland the discrepancy of 0.5 percentage points is 
neither small nor large.  
 
                                                       
16 There are 9 countries that did not declare MTO in their 2009 updates of SCP and 3 countries did not even submit the SCP at the 
time of this writing. 
17 As for the remaining 4, in Ireland, Hungary, and Netherlands our MTOMT* only slightly exceeds the MTOD value or the lower 
bound of the MTOD range, while is Luxembourg the failure must be due to the country choosing to use the annualized value of cost 
of ageing cumulated until 2040 and not the 0.33 S2E 
18 A country announcing a commitment to a very demanding MTO -i.e. well above MTOMT- may lack credibility and hence it 
makes no sense to make such announcement. In addition, there is the risk of declaring a too ambitious MTO and subsequently find 
that recovery falters and it is difficult -even undesirable- to deliver fiscal consolidation, which would undermine the confidence 
sought in the first place. We think these arguments apply to Italy and hence warrant the educated guess underlying the algorithm 
calibration, namely that this country has declared an MTOD close to MTOMT.  






3.3  Strengths and weaknesses of the new MTO methodology 
Three advantages of the new methodology for implementing MTO determination criteria 
should be acknowledged vis-a-vis the ad hoc approach adopted during the transition period 
established by the European Council.  
 
First,  the  MTO  methodology  enhances  the  transparency,  simplicity,  and  political 
commitment of the procedures for setting medium-term budgetary targets. It is apparent that, 
despite of the algorithm for calculating minimum targets not being yet disclosed to the general 
public,  the  CoC‟s  statements  provide  enough  guidance  on  the  rationale  and  effective 
implementation of the several components of the algorithm. Simplicity of the MTO methodology 
facilitates  understanding  and  technical  discussion  between  the  parties  interested  in  the  EU 
fiscal  framework  –notably  the  European  Commission  and  Member  States  engaged  in 
multilateral  budgetary  surveillance,  SCP  assessments,  and  excessive  deficit  procedures-.  In 
addition, fiscal prudence is likely to be strengthened because countries no longer can set too 
loose MTOs that just cover the minimum benchmarks -as they could during transition phase-. 
 
Second, MTOs are now embedded into a well-defined quantitative framework: for each 
EU  country,  precise  values  can  be  computed  for  the  MTO  minimum  benchmark,  the  debt- 




stabilising budget balance, the supplementary debt-reduction effort, and the partial frontloading 
of the cost of ageing. The analytical pieces of the whole framework –output gaps, budgetary 
sensitivities, Maastricht reference values, sustainability indicators, etc.- take extensive stock of 
theoretical  and  applied  work  jointly  developed  by  the  European  Commission  and  Member 
States.  This  ensures  compatibility  of  the  MTO  methodology  with  other  formal  procedures 
existing at EU level. 
 
Third, MTOs give now an explicit role to government liabilities, both explicit and implicit, 
in the setting of minimum budgetary targets. MTOs, therefore, can modulate the constraints 
imposed on budgetary  policies of a Member State to its own fiscal behaviour in the past  –
summarized by the current public debt level- as well as to its fiscal challenges in the future –
especially the impact of ageing on public spending-.  
 
The  consideration  of  explicit  liabilities  as  determinants  of  MTOs  involves  a  clear 
distinction between low-debt and high-debt countries and allows for a differentiated treatment of 
both  groups.  Low-debt  countries  are  granted  a  larger  margin  of  manoeuvre  in  managing 
government debt -for instance to finance additional public investment-. They are not seen as 
posing immediate threats for the macroeconomic and financial stability of E(M)U, and any slight 
increase in their debt levels is not perceived as a potential source of destabilising, cross-border, 
financial  spillovers.  High-debt  countries,  on  the  other  hand,  are  required  to  achieve  more 
demanding MTOs, which boils down to generate higher public savings –as proportion of GDP- 
in order to gradually reduce their debt ratios and the potential threats they entail to the E(M)U. 
The supplementary debt-reduction effort implements such a requirement in practice.
19  
 
The introduction of implicit liabilities in the MTOs, in particular, ensures that a budgetary 
safety margin is being procured so as to cope with the projected increase in age -related 
expenditure. A full frontloading of the cost of ageing would pre -finance the whole expected 
increase in age-related expenditure over a long term horizon, whereas a partial frontloading 
implies that the remaining gap will have to be somehow financed later on  –e.g. through the 
implementation of additional structural reforms to cut prospective spending, or the reduction of 
other public expenditures unrelated to social security, or the increase in taxes, or a mix of the 
previous alternatives-. To acknowledge Member States‟ ownership on  the choice of policies 
financing  the  cost  of  ageing,  the  new  MTO  methodology  opted  for  a  partial  degree  of 
frontloading. Nevertheless, a minimum degree of frontloading is required from all EU countries 
(the coefficient k discussed above), because if they were free to choose any arbitrary degree, 
the incentives to implement pension reforms or to maintain those already enacted would be 
weaker. By contrast, in order to strengthen these incentives, the CoC states that MTOs could be 
revised regularly and in any case after the implementation of major structural reforms having an 
impact on age-related expenditures. 
 
A critical assessment of MTOs and the long-term sustainability of public finances 
 
In the remaining part of this section, we assess critically the extent to which the specific 
modalities  for  introducing  government  liabilities  into  the  MTO  algorithm  make  or  not  a 
substantial contribution to the preservation of long-term sustainability of public finances, which 
admittedly should be the ultimate goal of those modalities. Contrary to the great expectations 
created  by  the  new  MTO  methodology,  the  analysis  shows  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
supplementary debt-reduction effort does not accelerate significantly the convergence of debt-
                                                       
19 A hypothetical high-debt country facing no cost of ageing could target a MTO that only stabilizes the 
debt-to-GDP ratio at 60 percent. Such a budgetary strategy would be fully consistent with the 
intertemporal budget constraint under the assumption of no uncertainty. If instead uncertainty is allowed 
for, that strategy neither can be deemed sustainable nor can be consistent with the limits set by the SGP. 
In case of a prolonged period of low growth and/or high interest rates, a high-debt country should then be 
required to consolidate public finances more and faster than a low-debt country.  




to-GDP ratios towards the Maastricht 60 percent reference value, and, on the other, the partial 
frontloading of cost of ageing falls short of providing enough incentives to undertake structural 
reforms  to  reduce  the  future  path  of  age-related  expenditure  vis-à-vis  the  alternative  of 
engaging in a standard medium-term consolidation process. 
 
According to the supplementary debt-reduction effort in equation (2), for a high-debt 
country, a 10 percentage point (p.p.) increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio raises the MTOSM* by 
0.33 p.p. of GDP, and, provided that MTOSM* is the maximum in equation (1), it also raises the 
MTOMT* by the same amount. To be sure, such an increase in the MTOMT* represents a 
significant adjustment on the structural budget balance that should be achieved in the medium-
term. It is then apparent that the required effort penalizes high-debt countries and imposes the 
necessity of further fiscal tightening in the next few years.  
 
But the stated purpose of the supplementary debt-reduction effort is to ensure rapid 
progress  towards  sustainability,  not  to  penalize  high-debt  countries  for  its  own  sake  by 
triggering further requirements of fiscal discipline. Therefore, an assessment of the effort on its 
own merits should be based on how much it accelerates convergence of the debt ratio towards 
the Maastricht 60 percent reference value, and not on how much medium-term consolidation it 
requires from high-debt countries. In this regard, it turns out that the effort has little impact –if 
any- on the pace at which the debt-to-GDP of a high-debt country would decline over time if the 
MTO were reached as scheduled, and even if the MTO were permanently hit. In other words, 
the supplementary debt-reduction effort is ineffective as a means of inducing convergence, as 
the simple debt dynamics exercise below illustrates. 
 
Consider a high-debt country having representative values for all the relevant variables 
and  parameters  involved  in  the  dynamics  of  public  debt  and  the  determination  of  MTOs: 
nominal GDP growth rate is constant at 3.5 percent, nominal interest rate is 5 percent, the S2E 
is constant at 2.5 percent of GDP (as the simple average for Germany, France, Italy, and UK), 
MTOMB is -1.5 percent of GDP, and MTOEA is -1 percent of GDP. The country inherits a level 
of debt that could be 70, 90, or 110 percent of GDP. Assume that in each and every year, the 
country  declares  MTOD  identical  to  the  MTOMT  and  is  always  capable  of  achieving  the 
committed target by running a structural budget balance in line with MTOMT. Finally, consider 
two algorithms for computing MTOMT: the first MTOMT is the current one adopted in the EU 
given by equation (3) with k=0.033; the second MTOMT is similar to equation (3) but with k=0, 
thus  excluding  the  supplementary  debt-reduction  effort.  The  paths  of  debt-to-GDP  ratio 
corresponding to the alternative initial debt levels and the two MTOMT algorithms are depicted 
in Figure 1. The paths of MTOMTs are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
In the figures,  the MTOMTs drive  the dynamics of the  debt ratios at any  time. The 
MTOMT with supplementary debt-reduction effort initially follows the MTOSM, which is more 
demanding than MTOMB and MTOEA, and is updated periodically as the debt ratio declines 
over  time;  at  some  point,  however,  the  MTOEA  prevails  and  then  MTOMT  stabilises  at  -1 
percent  of  GDP.  The  MTOMT  without  the  supplementary  debt-reduction  effort  is  always 














































































Initial debt 110% of GDP and MTOMT* with SDRE Initial debt 110% and MTOMT* without SDRE
Initial debt 90% of GDP and MTOMT* with SDRE Initial debt 90% and MTOMT* without SDRE
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The exercise puts forward that the MTOMT with supplementary debt-reduction effort 
does not perform terribly better than the MTOMT without such effort in terms of inducing faster 
convergence of the debt-to-GDP ratios towards the 60 percent value. For initial debt levels at 70 
and 90 percent of GDP, the paths of debt ratio for the two MTOMTs are almost indistinguishable. 
Starting with debt at 110 percent of GDP, the MTOMT with effort needs 23 years to bring debt 
below 60 percent of GDP, while the MTOMT without effort needs just 6 years more. 
 
The  intuition  shown  by  the  exercise  can  be  extended  to  a  formal  argument.  The 
variation in the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the net borrowing as proportion of GDP and the 
growth dividend given by -(d g)/(1+g). For nominal GDP growth g=3.5 percent and debt d=100 
percent of GDP, the growth dividend is around 3.5 percent of GDP. For any reasonable value of 
parameter k, the corresponding MTOMT is much smaller than the growth dividend. For instance,  




in the exercise with k=0.033, the more demanding MTOMT is just 0.4 percent of GDP. It then 
turns out that for high-debt countries the growth dividend largely dominates the net borrowing 
resulting from hitting MTOs and thus drives the pace of debt dynamics regardless of the size of 
MTOs. The argument indeed holds not only for very-high-debt countries but also for high-debt 
countries because both the MTOMT and the growth dividend are decreasing in the level of debt.  
 
Hence, for practical purposes, the inclusion of supplementary debt-reduction effort in 
the methodology for implementing the MTO determination criteria does little to ensure more 
rapid progress towards sustainability -vis-à-vis the exclusion of such effort-. There is, on the 
other hand, the effect of imposing larger consolidation efforts in the medium-term, but this is 
inconsistent with the purpose stated by the CoC. 
 
Turning to the frontloading of the cost of ageing, it should be noted that explicit and 
implicit liabilities affect symmetrically the long-term solvency condition of the government. In the 
intertemporal budget constraint, the future increases in spending flows associated with ageing 
can be converted into a notional stock by computing net present values (NPV). That notional 
stock  is  fully  comparable  with  the  current  stock  of  outstanding  debt  as  both  will  imply  the 
necessity of collecting taxes to pay for either additional primary spending or interests. For the 
same token, structural reforms that reduce future age-relating expenditure imply a reduction in 
the NPV of future spending flows that is comparable to a one-shot reduction in the outstanding 
debt stock.  
 
The  symmetry  acknowledged  in  the  solvency  condition  is  absent  in  the  MTO 
determination. Note first that the supplementary debt-reduction effort depends on the stock of 
explicit  liabilities,  while  the  frontloading  of  the  cost  of  ageing  is  indeed  a  flow  given  by  a 
proportion (say 0.33) of the S2E indicator. Consider a country with a debt ratio of 100 percent of 
GDP that undertakes pension reforms and improves permanently the primary balance-to-GDP 
ratio by 0.5 percentage point (p.p.). The S2E indicator declines by a similar amount and hence 
the MTOMT would decrease by 0.17 p.p. through the frontloading of cost of ageing. Assuming 
the  interest-growth  differential  to  be  constant  at  1.5  percent  over  time  (as  in  the  previous 
simulations),  the  NPV  of  the  permanent  improvement  in  the  primary  balance  ratio  is  33.3 
percent  of  GDP.  Therefore,  from  the  point  of  view  of  intertemporal  solvency,  the  pension 
reforms deliver an improvement equivalent in NPV to a one-shot reduction in the outstanding 
debt of 33.3 p.p. of GDP. But as far as MTOMTs are concerned, such a one-shot reduction in 
the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  would  bring  about  a  decline  in  MTOMT  of  1.09  p.p.  through  the 
supplementary debt-reduction effort.  
 
It  is  apparent  then  that,  for  a  Member  State  considering  a  standard  short-term 
budgetary consolidation that reduces the debt ratio against the alternative of launching a long-
term structural reform, but both having the same impact on solvency, the MTOs does not offer a 
balanced incentives but a clear preference for consolidation and very limited gains for structural 
reforms. It might be argued that there are reasons why explicit and implicit liabilities are not 
directly comparable, but still the difference between the gains in terms of lower MTOs resulting 
from reducing one or the other (1.09 vs 0.17) is too large and probably unwarranted. 
 
  




4  THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS ON 
MTOS 
4.1  The current situation of the EU Member States 
The financial and economic crisis along with the expansionary policies undertaken to 
support aggregate demand have led to sizable budget deficits and borrowing needs, in a scale 
never seen before during  the postwar period. The budgetary outcomes are not expected to 
recover rapidly in the next few years and indeed the mounting debt levels will have to be carried 
over  for  many  years.  The  severity  of  the  2008-2009  crisis  and  the  magnitude  of  the  fiscal 
challenges going forward are apparent from a comparison between the SCP updates submitted 
by  EU  Member  States  in  2007,  2008,  and  2009,  in  terms  of  declared  MTOs,  dates  of 
achievement, and gaps between structural budget balances and MTOs (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Declared MTOs, dates of achievement, and gaps between structural budget balances and MTOs in SCP 2007, 2008, and 2009 (% of GDP).
Belgium BE 0.5 2009 -0.3 -0.8 1.0 0.5 yes 0.5 n.d. no comm. n.d. -3.7 -2.0
Bulgaria BG 1.5 2010 2.9 1.4 3.1 1.6 yes 1.5 t.p.p. 0.5 n.d. -1.0 -1.5 1.0 0.5 yes
Czech Republic CZ -1.0 2012 -4.1 -3.1 -2.5 -1.5 no -1.0 2012 no comm. n.d. -5.5 -2.6
Denmark DK 0.75 to 1.75 t.p.p. 3.5 2.3 2.5 1.3 yes 0.75 to 1.75 t.p.p. no comm. n.d. -0.6 -0.8
Germany DE 0.0 2007 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.0 yes 0.0 to 0.5 n.d. -0.5 n.d. -1.5 -1.0 -3.0 -2.5 no
Estonia EE 0.0 t.p.p. 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 yes 0.0 2011 0.0 or higher n.d. -0.8 -0.8 0.5 0.5 yes
Ireland IE 0.0 2007 0.5 0.5 -0.7 -0.7 no 0.0 to 0.5 n.d. -0.5 to 0.0 n.d. -9.3 -9.0 -6.8 -6.6 no
Greece EL 0.0 2012 -2.8 -2.8 -0.5 -0.5 no 0.0 n.d. no comm. n.d. -7.8 -2.1
Spain ES 0.0 2007 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 yes 0.0 n.d. no comm. n.d. -10.0 -4.6
France FR 0.0 2012 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 no 0.0 2012 0.0 n.d. -5.8 -5.8 -2.8 -2.8 no
Italy IT 0.0 2011 -2.2 -2.2 -0.5 -0.5 no 0.0 n.d. 0.0 n.d. -3.6 -3.6 -2.0 -2.0 no
Cyprus CY 0.0 2007 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.8 yes 0.0 n.d. n.a. n.d. -3.4 na
Latvia LV -1.0 t.p.p. -0.5 0.5 1.7 2.7 yes -1.0 n.d. -1.0 n.d. -8.1 -7.1 -0.5 0.5 yes
Lithuania LT -1.0 2009 -1.2 -0.2 1.1 2.1 yes -1.0 2010 no comm. n.d. -7.5 -1.7
Luxembourg LU -0.8 2007 0.7 1.5 1.6 2.4 yes -0.8 n.d. 0.5 n.d. 0.4 -0.1 -4.0 -4.5 no
Hungary HU -0.5 n.d. -4.8 -4.3 -2.5 -2.0 no 0.5 n.d. -1.5 n.d. -2.5 -1.0 -1.5 0.0 yes
Malta MT 0.0 2010 -2.1 -2.1 0.1 0.1 yes 0.0 2011 0.0 n.d. -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 no
Netherlands NL -1.0 to -0.5 t.p.p. -0.3 0.5 0.8 1.6 yes -0.5 to -1.0 t.p.p. -0.5 to 0.5 n.d. -3.5 -3.5 -3.6 -3.6 no
Austria AT 0.0 2010 -0.7 -0.7 0.1 0.1 yes 0.0 n.d. 0.0 n.d. -2.6 -2.6 -2.4 -2.4 no
Poland PL -1.0 2011 -2.4 -1.4 -1.1 -0.1 no -1.0 2012 -1.0 n.d. -7.1 -6.1 -2.9 -1.9 no
Portugal PT -0.5 2010 -2.1 -1.6 -0.3 0.2 yes -0.5 n.d. n.a. n.d. -6.6 na
Romania RO -0.9 n.d. -3.4 -2.5 -2.7 -1.8 no -0.9 2012 n.a. n.d. -7.1 na
Slovenia SI -1.0 t.p.p. -0.8 0.2 -0.1 0.9 yes -1.0 n.d. no comm. n.d. -4.8 -2.1
Slovakia SK -1.0 or higher 2010 -3.0 -2.0 -1.2 -0.2 no -1.0 2010 no comm. n.d. -5.2 -2.6
Finland FI 2.0 t.p.p. 4.2 2.2 2.8 0.8 yes 2.0 t.p.p. 0.5 n.d. 0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -1.5 no
Sweden SE 1.0 t.p.p. 2.4 1.4 3.4 2.4 yes 1.0 t.p.p. 1.0 n.d. 1.4 0.4 0.6 -0.4 no
United Kingdom UK no comm. n.d. -3.0 -1.9 no comm. n.d. no comm. n.d. -9.0 -4.7
(1)  Declared MTO: 'no comm.' indicates that no commitment is explicitly made by the country in the SCP; 'n.a.' indicates SCP is not available.
(2)  Date to achieve MTO: 'n.d.' indicates that the date of achievement is not declared in the SCP; 't.p.p.' indicates the MTO is achieved throughout the programme period; 'n.a.' indicates the SCP is not available
(3)  For Denmark and Netherlands, distance to the central point of MTO range; for Slovakia, distance to the minimum value of MTO range.
(4)  For Ireland and Netherlands, distance to the central point of MTO range; for Estonia, distance to the minimum value of MTO range.
Sources: SCP 2007's declared MTO and structural balances are from European Commission's Public Finances in EMU 2008, p.37 and country annexes respectively.
              SCP 2008's declared MTO are from 2008 Updates of Stability and Convergence Program.
              SCP 2009's declared MTO and structural balances are from 2009 Updates of Stability and Convergence Program, submitted by countries in January 2010.
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In the 2007 updates of SCP, submitted before the crisis unfolded, the expectation was 
that achieving MTOs would not be a too difficult task. In fact, all countries but UK declared 
MTOs and  were committed to achieving them no later than 2012. There  were 12 countries 
whose initial structural budget balance as of 2007 was already above the declared MTO value. 
Consolidation efforts were expected from the 14 countries with a 2007 budgetary position below 
MTO, but the required efforts were fairly small as the gap to be bridged by gradually improving 
structural budget balances over the programme period was less than 2.5 p.p. of GDP for 11 out 
of 14 cases. Overall, as early as 2010, three years after the update submission, as many as 17 
countries would have achieved their committed MTOs. 
 
The picture radically changed as EU Member States started to factor in the fiscal effects 
of the crisis and policy interventions. By the time of submitting the 2008 updates of SCP, the 
uncertainty of the environment and the difficulties to envisage future macroeconomic and policy 
scenarios  induced  EU  countries  to  relax  commitments  on  MTOs.  Eventually  they  declared  




MTOs but postponed the date of achievement or refrained from committing themselves to any 
date.  Only  5  out  of  27  EU  Member  States  indicated  that  their  MTOs  would  be  achieved 
throughout the programme period. 
 
At present, the 2009 updates of SCP recently submitted are meant to incorporate at 
length the impact of the crisis on public finances and to discuss consolidation policies to be 
implemented to restore fiscal soundness –especially those EU Member States going through 
the excessive deficit procedure-. The expectation now is that achieving MTOs in the aftermath 
of the crisis would be rather difficult and sizable consolidation efforts should be undertaken.  
 
On the one hand, as many as 13 EU countries have either refrained from declaring 
MTOs or failed to submit the SCP 2009 updates altogether. Reluctance to declare MTOs and 
achievement  dates  suggests  that  countries  are  seeking  flexibility  to  modulate  their  exit 
strategies  -whose  short-run  effects  are  certainly  contractive-  to  the  pace  of  the  economic 
recovery  –which  is  expected  to  be  slow-.
20 On the other hand, there are 15 countries that 
declared MTOs but posted an initial structural budget balance in 2009 far below the MTO values 
–with the sole exception of Sweden-. The political feasibility of the consolidation efforts needed 
to achieve the committed MTOs remains to be seen. Only a small handful of countries would 
reach their MTOs in 2012, three years after the update submission.
21 
 
In any case, it must be recognized that the credibility of MTOs as constraints on medium-term 
fiscal policies has been undermined since the beginning of the crisis, either because countries 
are not committed to achieve any target or because they are committed to achieve too 
ambitious targets. 
 
4.2  Crisis, public debt, and MTOs 
 
The current MTOs declared in the 2009 updates of SCP have been set using the debt 
stocks at the end of 2008, which for practical purposes should be deemed pre-crisis levels of 
debt. The future MTOs to be set around 2012, instead, will be based on the much larger post-
crisis  debt  levels.  The  ongoing  crisis-driven  debt  accumulation,  therefore,  will  imply  more 
demanding MTOs vis-à-vis the current ones. In particular, some countries whose debt ratios 
were  below  60  percent  in  2008  will  exceed  that  threshold  and  so  the  supplementary  debt-
reduction effort will kick in. In addition, most countries having high debt levels already in 2008 
will be required to intensify their debt-reduction efforts.  
 
Figure 3 presents the current MTOs -if declared- along with our estimates MTOMT* for 
the debt stocks at the end of 2008 and 2012 –as reported by EU countries in their SCP 2009 
updates-.22 The MTOMT*s computed using the 2012 debt constitute estimates of the impact on 
MTOs  of  the  debt  accumulation  induced  by  the  crisis.  For  13  countries,  the  crisis-driven 
increase in the debt ratio between 2008 and 2012 would lead to more demanding MTOMT* in 
2012 vis-à-vis today‟s, in some cases with MTOMT* rising more than 0.5 p.p. of GDP. Ireland, 
Spain, Cyprus, Netherlands, and UK are the pre-crisis low-debt countries that would turn into 
                                                       
20 For instance, the countries‟ own projections indicate that the EU average output gap would be 4.2 percent of potential GDP in 
2010 and still 2.3 percent in 2012. 
21 Several EU Member States countries have not declared MTOs so the gap to be bridged cannot be properly assessed. But if we 
consider the less demanding requirement on the budgetary targets, namely the MTOMBs whose representative value is around -1.5 
percent of GDP, it turns out that the initial budgetary positions of EU countries incurring in structural deficits are, on average, 3.5 
p.p. below the representative MTOMB. As the gap is quite sizable, the European Commission and Member States have agreed that 
annual improvements in structural budget balances should be larger than the 0.5 p.p. of GDP figure discussed above. 
22 Table 3 at the end of this section reports all the estimates underlying Figures 3, 4, and 5.   




post-crisis  high-debt  countries  and  be  imposed  the  supplementary  debt-reduction  effort. 
Belgium,  Germany,  Greece,  France,  Italy,  Malta,  Austria,  and  Portugal,  on  the  other  hand, 
would remain as high-debt countries and be requested additional debt-reduction efforts. 
 
Fig. 3   MTOs declared in 2009 SCP vs MTOMT* for debt stocks at the end of 2008 and 2012 (% of GDP) 
 
4.3  Crisis, potential growth, and MTOs 
The current MTOs have been set using the latest AWG projections of potential growth 
and age-related expenditure covering 2008-2060, which are involved in computing the debt-
stabilising budget balance and the partial frontloading of cost of ageing –i.e. the fraction 0.33 of 
the S2E indicator-. The AWG projections were elaborated early in 2008 and predicated on a 
baseline  scenario  for  demographic  and  macroeconomic  variables  that  did  not  envisage  the 
current crisis (hereinafter referred to as the no-crisis scenario). To address the lack of realism of 
the baseline scenario, AWG has recently made available an alternative set of scenarios and 
projections of growth and age-related expenditure that do take the crisis on board and explore 
different paths of recovery. The so-called lost decade scenario, in particular, envisages lower 
growth rates of potential GDP for all EU countries until 2020 –vis-à-vis the no-crisis scenario-.23 
The bottom line remains, nevertheless, that the current MTOs do rely on an already unrealistic 
set of projections based on the no-crisis scenario. 
 
As suggested by several empirical studies, the crisis is likely to depress potential GDP 
growth for several years as well as to change the cost of ageing over a long-term horizon.24 
The future MTOs ought to incorporate these realities, which are disregarded throughout by the 
current  MTOs.  More  demanding  future  MTOs  will  result  from  the  deterioration  of  growth 
potential in all EU countries, whereas, on the other hand, the ambiguous effect of the crisis on 
the cost of ageing might increase or decrease MTOs depending on country-specific features of 
pension and health systems.  
 
Figure 4 presents the current MTOs -if declared- along with our estimates MTOMT* for 
the AWG no-crisis and lost decade scenarios. For the latter scenario, the MTOMT*s provide an 
                                                       
23 For details, see European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009, p.177-188) and European Commission (2009b, 
p.47-53). 
24 Because of institutional features of many EU countries‟ pension and health systems, a sufficiently long period of lower output 
levels would give rise to a tilted, upward shift in the path of age-related expenditures as proportion of GDP, eventually increasing 
the cost of ageing. Other countries, by contrast, would experience a reduction in the cost of ageing. See European Commission 
(2009b, p.51-52).  




estimates of the impact on MTOs of the lower growth potential and changing cost of ageing that 
would characterise the aftermath of the crisis. MTOMT*s in the lost decade scenario are tighter 
than  in  the  no-crisis  scenario  for  15  countries.  Differences  of  more  than  0.5  p.p.  of  GDP 
between the two scenarios are observed in Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Spain, Austria, 
and Slovenia. Interestingly, it is the large increase in the cost of ageing that leads to tightening 
in the MTOs so as to frontload the corresponding implicit liabilities. The reduction in the average 
long-term growth rates of potential GDP have little direct effect on MTOMT*s through the debt-
stabilising budget balance.     
 




4.4  An integrated scenario for the crisis aftermath 
 
We construct an integrated scenario by combining the debt projected for 2012 and the 
long-term projections of growth and age-related expenditure under the lost decade scenario. 
Figure  5  reports  the  current  MTOs  -if  declared-  along  with  our  estimates  MTOMT*  for  the 
integrated scenario. Our estimates now give an order of magnitude of the overall impact on 
MTOs of the crisis, mediated through the explosion of debt -which indeed has already started in 
2009- and the rise in implicit liabilities resulting from lower potential growth and higher cost of 
ageing –if the lost decade scenario were to materialize-. There are 19 countries with MTOMT*s 
for the integrated scenario that exceed the MTOMT* underlying the current MTOs. Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, Spain, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, and UK are those with the largest increases 
of MTOMT* in the integrated scenario vis-a-vis the current situation. The cases of Ireland and 
Spain are particularly worrisome because both explicit and implicit liabilities rise significantly.   
 
MTOs cannot be below the true MTOMT that we try to estimate through MTOMT* and we note 
that future MTOMT* are much higher than current MTOMT*. Therefore, our analysis suggests 
that, conditional upon the materialization of the underlying projections on debt and potential 
growth, a tightening on MTOs is a likely outcome of the next round of revisions around 2012. 
The debate on exit strategies for EU Member States should then take on board that MTOs 
based  on  the  new  methodology  will  become  more  demanding  in  the  future  following  the 
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Table 3: MTOMT* under debt as of 2008 and 2012 and no-crisis and lost decade scenarios (% of GDP unless otherwise specified).
Belgium BE 3.8 3.7 -2.2 -2.1 89.8 100.6 1.0 1.3 4.8 6.4 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3 -1.3 -1.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3
Bulgaria BG 3.7 3.6 -2.1 -2.1 14.1 14.4 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.8 -1.6 -1.6 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.6 -1.6 -1.8 -1.8
Czech Republic CZ 3.6 3.6 -2.1 -2.1 30.0 42.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 3.7 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.6 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Denmark DK 3.8 3.7 -2.2 -2.1 33.4 48.3 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.2 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -0.5 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Germany DE 3.2 3.1 -1.9 -1.8 65.9 81.0 0.2 0.7 3.3 4.8 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.5 -1.6 -1.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.5
Estonia EE 3.8 3.5 -2.2 -2.1 4.6 14.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -1.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Ireland IE 4.4 4.1 -2.5 -2.4 43.2 83.9 0.0 0.8 6.7 12.1 -0.3 0.5 1.6 2.4 -1.5 -1.0 -0.3 0.5 1.6 2.4
Greece EL 3.7 3.6 -2.1 -2.1 99.2 117.7 1.3 1.9 11.5 10.7 3.0 3.6 2.7 3.3 -1.4 -1.0 3.0 3.6 2.7 3.3
Spain ES 3.9 3.8 -2.2 -2.2 39.7 74.1 0.0 0.5 5.7 8.6 -0.4 0.1 0.6 1.1 -1.2 -1.0 -0.4 0.1 0.6 1.1
France FR 3.9 3.7 -2.2 -2.2 67.4 87.1 0.2 0.9 1.8 2.7 -1.4 -0.7 -1.0 -0.4 -1.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.7 -1.0 -0.4
Italy IT 3.5 3.3 -2.0 -1.9 105.8 114.6 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.9 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 -1.4 -1.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5
Cyprus CY 4.8 4.6 -2.7 -2.6 48.4 63.4 0.0 0.1 8.3 8.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 -1.8 -1.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Latvia LV 3.4 3.2 -2.0 -1.8 19.5 56.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.3 -1.3 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Lithuania LT 3.5 3.2 -2.0 -1.8 15.6 41.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.8 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -1.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6
Luxembourg LU 4.6 4.5 -2.6 -2.6 13.5 29.3 0.0 0.0 12.9 13.5 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.9 -1.0 -1.0 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.9
Hungary HU 3.7 3.4 -2.1 -2.0 72.9 73.6 0.4 0.4 1.5 2.2 -1.2 -1.2 -0.8 -0.8 -1.6 -1.2 -1.2 -0.8 -0.8
Malta MT 3.7 3.5 -2.1 -2.0 63.6 67.3 0.1 0.2 5.7 9.7 -0.1 0.0 1.3 1.4 -1.7 -1.0 -0.1 0.0 1.3 1.4
Netherlands NL 3.5 3.4 -2.0 -2.0 58.2 73.0 0.0 0.4 5.0 5.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -1.1 -1.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.3
Austria AT 3.7 3.6 -2.1 -2.1 62.6 73.8 0.1 0.5 3.1 4.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -1.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2
Poland PL 3.5 3.3 -2.0 -2.0 47.2 55.8 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -1.4 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5
Portugal PT 3.9 3.8 -2.2 -2.2 66.3 91.1 0.2 1.0 1.9 3.1 -1.4 -0.6 -1.0 -0.1 -1.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.1
Romania RO 3.8 3.6 -2.2 -2.1 13.6 31.3 0.0 0.0 4.9 5.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -1.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3
Slovenia SI 3.4 3.5 -2.0 -2.0 22.5 42.7 0.0 0.0 8.3 11.1 0.7 0.7 1.6 1.6 -1.6 -1.0 0.7 0.7 1.6 1.6
Slovakia SK 3.7 3.8 -2.2 -2.2 27.7 42.2 0.0 0.0 2.9 2.9 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Finland FI 3.7 3.6 -2.1 -2.1 34.2 54.4 0.0 0.0 4.5 4.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -1.2 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5
Sweden SE 3.9 3.8 -2.3 -2.2 38.0 45.2 0.0 0.0 1.6 3.1 -1.7 -1.7 -1.2 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
United Kingdom UK 4.1 4.0 -2.4 -2.3 55.5 90.9 0.0 1.0 3.6 4.4 -1.2 -0.2 -0.9 0.2 -1.4 -1.2 -0.2 -0.9 0.2
Sources: Debt levels are from 2009 Updates of Stability and Convergence Program, submitted by countries in January 2010.
               Debt for Cyprus, Portugal, and Romania in 2012 is from European Comission 2009 Autumn forecast and refers to 2011.
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5  AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD FOR THE SUPPLEMENTARY DEBT-
REDUCTION EFFORT 
 
5.1  Public debt and the specification of an ‘exposure index’ 
 
On theoretical grounds, an important feature of the new MTO methodology is that it 
establishes a link among three issues involved in the conduct of fiscal policy and the setting of 
credible budgetary targets: the amount of outstanding debt, the existence of implicit liabilities, 
and  the  determination  of  possible  leeway  to  undertake  discretionary  measures  and  public 
investment. On practical grounds, nevertheless, the advantages of the MTO methodology have 
been severely undermined by the current crisis and the discretionary policies deployed to cope 
with  it  inasmuch  as  debt  ratios  have  skyrocketed  and  eventually  overshadowed  any  other 
variable  in  the  determination  of  MTOs.  As  indicated  in  section  4,  the  supplementary  debt-
reduction effort will soon apply to several EU countries, making the exit strategies tougher. 
 
The financing of deficits, stimulus packages, or other forms of fiscal interventions in 
times of crisis often relies heavily on public debt issuance. In this particular crisis, the increase 
in explicit liabilities in many EU countries during 2008-2009 has not been a consequence of 
profligate governments but of governments coping either with the collapse of an unsustainable 
debt-led  growth  process  at  home  (UK,  Ireland)  or  with  the  contraction  of  output  due  to  the 
collapse in international trade (Germany, Italy). In such a context, focusing narrowly on the level 
of public debt may not be sufficient to address the stance of fiscal policy in order to set MTOs. 
Characteristics  of  the  public  debt,  the  performance  of  financial  and  banking  system,  and 
sectoral and external imbalances may all be important and worth considering in assessing the 
fiscal stance in the short- and medium-term.  
 
Against this backdrop, in this section we elaborate an alternative formulation for MTOs 
in which the supplementary debt-reduction effort is replaced by a synthetic exposure index that 
measures funding pressures and risks facing all sectors in a given country at a certain point in 
time.  The  exposure  index  not  only  includes  the  public  debt-to-GDP  ratio  but  also  several 
variables related to the short-term sustainability of public debt, the risk of distress in the financial 
and banking system -and thus the implicit liabilities for the public sector associated to possible 
bail outs-, and the build-up of sectoral and external imbalances.
25  
 
For the public sector, we consider the composition of debt in terms of residual maturity 
and the share held by non -resident investors. Maturity composition is gauged by the stock of 
government liabilities coming due in the next three years, which simultaneously measures short-
term refinancing needs and is a proxy for rollover risk facing the government. 26 The share of 
foreign holdings of public debt assesses the reliance of the government on foreign savings to 
                                                       
25 A similar analysis has been carried out by the European Commission (2010, pp.220-232), which has stressed the need to expand 
economic surveillance beyond the budgetary dimension to address other macroeconomic imbalances, including competitiveness 
developments and underlying structural challenges within the euro area. 
26 Another way to measure the refinancing risk would be to express the  amount of debt maturing in the following three years as a 
ratio of the amount of total debt rather than as a ratio of GDP. In this context we felt it was more consistent with what has been done 
for other variables to express the amount of debt maturing in the following three year as a ratio of GDP.  




place debt in the market, as well as its exposure to a situation where investors increase home 
bias –as observed in the current crisis-. 
 
The  banking  sector‟s  risk  exposure  on  assets  is  assessed  focusing  on  debtors‟ 
characteristics to emphasize counterparty risk. We first separate credit extended to domestic 
agents and to foreigners. Within domestic debtors, we consider the share of loans given to 
households and to corporates, whereas within foreign debtors, we consider the share of loans 
given  to  residents  of  emerging  markets  and  to  residents  of  developed  countries.  Funding 
pressures facing the banking sector, on the other hand, is gauged by the banks‟ total debt, the 
share of debt maturing in the next three years, and the ratio between total domestic loans and 
domestic deposits. The latter is a sort of funding gap measuring the reliance of the banking 
system on the wholesale funding markets, as well as its exposure to a situation where these 
markets dry up. This risk is of increasing relevance in the modern financial system because, 
while in old-fashioned banking crises depositors run against depository institutions, the current 
crisis has featured runs of lenders and investors financing banks through the wholesale funding 
market.  
 
As far as sectoral imbalances are concerned, we consider the net borrowing position of 
four  sectors  -households,  non-financial  corporate,  financial  corporate,  and  the  general 
government-  as  an  indicator  of  their  financing  needs  originated  in  income-expenditure 
imbalances.   
 
Finally,  external  imbalances  are  assessed  using  the  net  borrowing  position  of  the 
economy as a whole –i.e. the current account- and the debt composition by maturity aggregated 
across  the  aforementioned  four  sectors.  Together  the  two  indicators  measure  the  funding 
pressures  facing  the  country,  arising  from  income-expenditure  imbalances  and  short-term 
refinancing needs. In addition, they reflect the country‟s exposure to a liquidity crisis or even to 
a sudden stop.  
 
Data and results 
 
For the variables described above,  we collected data corresponding to the main 10 
Euro Area countries in 2005 -well before the start of the crisis- and 2009 -the last year in terms 
of data availability-.27 All variables are expressed in terms of GDP. We then selected six sub-
indices addressing the exposure of public sector, the composition of foreign assets, domestic 
assets,  and  liabilities  of  the  banking  sector,  and  the  sectoral  net  borrowing  and  debt 
composition  of  the  four  sectors  mentioned  above.  For  each  sub-index  we  ranked  the 
performance of all countries from the best grading 1 to the worst performer grading 10. We 
averaged the single sub-component scores along all the dimensions under study and ranked 
the countries accordingly.28  
 
                                                       
27 Data for GDP and public debt are from AMECO. The figures on the “share of public debt maturing in the following 3 year” and 
the “Foreign holding of public debt” are  either from national Central Banks‟ or National Debt Management Bodies or National 
Treasury sources. Data on the “Banking Sector, loan exposure to foreign debtors” are from BIS (Consolidated foreign claims of 
reporting banks - ultimate risk basis). As they are expressed in million of dollar the ratio with respect to GDP has been obtained 
using IMF GDP in PPS (WEO database). Data on “Banking Sector, loan, exposure to domestic debtors” are from, ECB, Money, 
banking and financial markets, MFI balance sheets. Data on Banking sector funding are from ECB, Money, banking and financial 
markets, MFI balance sheets as far as the ratio between loan and deposit is concerned. Debt securities outstanding as well as Debt 
securities maturing in the following 3 year are from national Central Banks and National Treasury databases. Data on sectoral net 
borrowing are from AMECO. Data on sectoral short-term refinancing needs are from national central banks or treasuries as far as 
the series of “Financial Corporates Bonds”, “Non-financial Corporates – Bonds” and “General Government short-term share of 
public debt” are concerned. Data on Non-financial corporate (loans) and on short-term household loans are from Eurostat, financial 
Accounts Database. 
28 The average is un-weighted. Some preliminary analysis suggests that the ranking of countries is sensitive to alternative weighting 
schemes for aggregating the sub-indices.   




The resulting ranking constitutes the exposure index, giving 1 to the best performer and 
10 to the worst. The higher the value assigned by the indicator to a country, the more exposed 
the country is from a financial and fiscal point of view. Thus, the exposure index intends to 
provide an easy read of each country‟s fiscal and financial position relative to its peers within 
the Euro Area. In addition, as the exposure indicator summarizes variables associated with the 
funding pressures of the four sectors, it can be seen as measuring the outstanding amount of 
public as well as private liabilities in the economy. The exposure index and the underlying sub-
indicators are reported in Table 4.  
 
As far as the public debt sub-index is concerned, Italy and Greece rank poorly. Italy 
presents the highest debt in 2009 but performs relatively well in terms of the share of debt held 
by foreigners. By contrast, Greece presents a slightly lower public debt in 2009 with a similar 
maturity composition as the Italian one, but features a larger foreign exposition. From 2005 to 
2009, the relative position of Portugal deteriorates due to the increase in the level of public debt, 
whereas the positions of Belgium and the Netherlands worsen on the account of higher debt 
held abroad. In spite  of the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio  in 2009, the relative  average 
positions  of  Germany,  Ireland,  and  France  stay  constant,  whereas  the  overall  condition  for 
Austria improves.29 
 
The bank loan exposure to foreign countries (second sub-index) is a useful indicator of 
the degree of financial internationalization. However, in times of crisis, it becomes a good proxy 
of  the  risk  of  financial  contagion.  In  2009,  Ireland  scores  high  in  terms  of  banking  sector 
exposure  to  advanced  economies  whereas  Austria  is  largely  exposed  towards  emerging 
markets. Looking at the domestic bank exposure (third sub-index), Ireland and Spain lead the 
ranking with respect to peer countries. The sub-index on the banking sector funding measure 
stress felt by banks in case of a liquidity crisis or a depositors run. Ireland is again the most 
exposed country in 2009, followed by Spain and the Netherlands. 
 
The analysis of sectoral balances (fifth sub-index) shows that Greece is again the worst 
performer in 2009, with imbalances in both households and the government leading to a large 
current  account  deficit.  Portugal  and  Ireland  also  perform  poorly  with  sizable  government 
borrowing and external imbalances. Sectoral short-term refinancing needs indicator (last sub-
index)  rank Ireland and Portugal as the most exposed economies in 2009, given their high 
stocks of short-term debt held by financial corporates, non-financial corporate, and households. 
Italy follows due to the high amount of outstanding short-term public debt. 
 
The exposure index at the bottom of Table 4 shows that from 2005 to 2009 Ireland has 
worsened significantly as a consequence of imbalances borne by the household and financial 
corporate  sectors.  By  contrast,  the  relative  positions  of  Italy  and  Greece  have  deteriorated 
mainly on the account of the increasing public debt. But since the exposure indicator for Italy 
does not signal any particular stress in the financial corporate‟s and households‟ indebtedness, 








                                                       
29 Due to some lack of comparable data among countries, data concerning the composition by maturity of government debts for 
2005 are referred to debt maturing in the first year and not in the first three years. This aspect can somehow affect the relative 
performance of countries with large Treasury Bill programs (like Italy, France and Germany), which could turn out to be low ranked 
even having a high average maturity of total debt.   





Table 4: Ranking of countries and the composition of the exposure index 
 
 
BE DE IE EL ES FR IT NL AT PT
2009 8 5 3 9 1 6 10 2 4 7
2005 8 7 1 9 2 6 10 3 5 4
2009 9 4 2 8 3 7 10 5 1 6
2005 9 4 3 2 5 10 7 6 1 8
2009 5 4 8 7 3 6 2 9 1 10
2005 4 2 9 7 3 5 1 6 8 10
2009 7.3 4.3 4.3 8.0 2.3 6.3 7.3 5.3 2.0 7.7
2005 7.0 4.3 4.3 6.0 3.3 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.7 7.3
2009 8 6 10 1 5 7 2 9 4 3
2005 9 8 1 2 5 7 3 10 6 4
2009 9 2 5 6 8 4 1 7 10 3
2005 7 4 1 3 8 5 2 9 10 6
2009 8.5 4 7.5 3.5 6.5 5.5 1.5 8 7 3
2005 8 6 1 2.5 6.5 6 2.5 9.5 8 5
2009 2 6 10 3 9 5 1 7 4 8
2005 3 7 9 2 6 4 1 10 5 8
2009 1 2 10 3 9 4 5 7 6 8
2005 1 4 10 3 8 2 5 6 7 9
2009 1.5 4.0 10.0 3.0 9.0 4.5 3.0 7.0 5.0 8.0
2005 2.0 5.5 9.5 2.5 7.0 3.0 3.0 8.0 6.0 8.5
2009 1 3 10 2 5 7 9 6 4 8
2005 1 3 9 2 6 5 10 8 4 7
2009 2 5 9 1 6 3 4 10 7 8
2005 3 5 9 1 7 2 4 10 6 8
2009 1 3 9 4 6 2 5 10 7 8
2005 3 6 9 1 8 2 4 10 5 7
2009 1.3 3.7 9.3 2.3 5.7 4.0 6.0 8.7 6.0 8.0
2005 2.3 4.7 9.0 1.3 7.0 3.0 6.0 9.3 5.0 7.3
2009 5 4 2 3 7 6 9 1 8 10
2005 3 5 4 2 10 8 7 1 6 9
2009 7 3 6 10 1 4 5 9 2 8
2005 6 1 9 10 8 4 3 7 2 5
2009 5 1 9 10 8 7 4 3 2 6
2005 5 7 1 9 2 6 8 3 4 10
2009 4 1 7 10 8 6 5 2 3 9
2005 3 2 7 10 8 6 5 1 4 9
2009 5.3 2.3 6.0 8.3 6.0 5.8 5.8 3.8 3.8 8.3
2005 4.3 3.8 5.3 7.8 7.0 6.0 5.8 3.0 4.0 8.3
2009 1 3 9 4 6 2 5 10 7 8
2005 3 6 9 1 8 2 4 10 5 7
2009 4 9 6 3 2 10 5 7 1 8
2005 3 9 2 7 4 10 6 8 1 5
2009 8 1 10 2 5 6 9 3 4 7
2005 9 1 10 3 5 4 8 6 2 7
2009 1 3 10 9 5 2 4 6 7 8
2005 1 5 10 9 3 2 4 6 8 7
2009 9 4 2 8 3 7 10 5 1 6
2005 9 4 3 2 5 10 7 6 1 8
2009 4.6 4 7.4 5.2 4.2 5.4 6.6 6.2 4 7.4
2005 5 5 6.8 4.4 5 5.6 5.8 7.2 3.4 6.8
BE DE IE EL ES FR IT NL AT PT
2009 4.8 3.7 7.4 5.0 5.6 5.2 5.0 6.5 4.6 7.1
2005 4.8 4.9 6.0 4.1 6.0 5.1 4.8 7.0 5.2 7.2
2009 3 1 10 5 7 6 4 8 2 9
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Share of debt maturing in the following 3 yrs















































































































5.2  The application of the exposure index to the new MTO calculation 
 
 
The  fiscal  and  financial  exposure  index  can  be  used  to  rank  all  countries  on  a  0-1 
interval, as presented in Figure 6. In order to compute minimum budgetary targets MTOMT*s 
taking on board a wider range of liabilities as well as sectoral and external imbalances, we use 
the exposure index in substitution of the (calibrated) supplementary debt-reduction effort. The 
results are reported in Table 5. On average, MTOMT*s with exposure index are more or less 
demanding depending on the assessment of imbalances in the banking, financial corporate, and 
household sectors. High-debt countries with low underlying sectoral imbalances converge to a 
minimum budgetary target less stringent than what estimated using the supplementary debt-
reduction effort.  
 
Under  the  no-crisis  scenario,  Germany,  the  country  with  the  less  worrying  sectoral 
imbalances,  has  an  MTOMT*  with  exposure  index  less  demanding  that  the  MTOMT*  with 
supplementary debt-reduction effort (-0.8 percent of GDP rather than -0.6 percent). Compared 
to the MTO declared in the 2009 update of SCP, this result would assure to German authorities 
some additional leeway for expansionary fiscal policy in case of need.  
 
For Italy, an economy with high-debt but limited sectoral imbalances, our alternative 
methodology  implies a  less demanding  MTOMT* (-1 percent  of GDP instead  of a balanced 
positions). The difference is substantial as it would allow to Italy to save, ceteris paribus, two 
years of the 0.5 p.p. consolidation required by the SGP.   
 
By  contrast,  the  introduction  of  the  exposure  index  would  require  a  much  tighter 
MTOMT*  for  Ireland  (0.7  percent  of  GDP  against  -0.3  percent).  Being  an  economy 
characterized  by  low  public  debt  but  with  large  external  imbalances  and  refinancing  needs, 
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Table 5: MTOMT* using Exposure Index (% of GDP unless otherwise specified).
Belgium BE 3.8 3.7 -2.2 -2.1 0.3 4.8 6.4 -0.3 0.3 -1.3 -1.0 -0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 no comm.
Germany DE 3.2 3.1 -1.9 -1.8 0.0 3.3 4.8 -0.8 -0.2 -1.6 -1.0 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.5
Ireland IE 4.4 4.1 -2.5 -2.4 1.0 6.7 12.1 0.7 2.6 -1.5 -1.0 0.7 2.6 -0.3 1.6 -0.5 to 0.0
Greece EL 3.7 3.6 -2.1 -2.1 0.4 11.5 10.7 2.1 1.8 -1.4 -1.0 2.1 1.8 3.0 2.7 no comm.
Spain ES 3.9 3.8 -2.2 -2.2 0.5 5.7 8.6 0.2 1.2 -1.2 -1.0 0.2 1.2 -0.4 0.6 no comm.
France FR 3.9 3.7 -2.2 -2.2 0.4 1.8 2.7 -1.2 -0.8 -1.6 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
Italy IT 3.5 3.3 -2.0 -1.9 0.4 1.5 1.9 -1.2 -1.0 -1.4 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Netherlands NL 3.5 3.4 -2.0 -2.0 0.7 5.0 5.5 0.4 0.6 -1.1 -1.0 0.4 0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 to 0.5
Austria AT 3.7 3.6 -2.1 -2.1 0.2 3.1 4.5 -0.9 -0.4 -1.6 -1.0 -0.9 -0.4 -1.0 -0.5 0.0
Portugal PT 3.9 3.8 -2.2 -2.2 0.9 1.9 3.1 -0.7 -0.2 -1.5 -1.0 -0.7 -0.2 -1.0 -1.0 n.a.
(1)  Declared MTO: 'no comm.' indicates that no commitment is explicitly made by the country in the SCP; 'n.a.' indicates SCP is not available.
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6  CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper has been threefold. Firstly, by relying on the information 
contained  in  the  last  batch  of  the  SCPs,  it  analyzed  the  new  MTO  methodology  recently 
adopted by EU Member States on the basis of a calibrated algorithm that closely follows the still 
undisclosed formulation  on which Member States agreed upon. In this framework, the most 
critical aspects regarding the modalities to take on board government liabilities have then been 
extensively discussed.  
 
Secondly,  it  presented  an  assessment  of  the  impact  of  the  current  crisis  on  the 
modalities  for  determining  MTOs.  Current  and  future  lower  bounds  for  MTOs  have  been 
calculated measuring the incidence on the budgetary targets of changes in public debt, potential 
growth, and the projected cost of ageing.  
 
Thirdly, relying on the presumption that the new MTO methodology focus only on a 
handful of fiscal and growth variables and neglects other important determinants affecting the 
short-term sustainability of public finances, the paper has outlined a simple alternative modality 
to introduce into the MTO determination, together with the level of current public debt, other 
elements connected with the building-up of external and domestic imbalances. The proposed 
modality to take into account of such explicit current liabilities is based on the construction of an 
exposure indicator. This indicator adopts a simple metric -based on a number of variables such 
as the composition of public debt by maturity, the structure of the private sector indebtedness, 
and financial market judgements- and allows for easily ranking countries along different fiscal 
and financial dimensions.   
 
Our results show that the new MTO values heavily depend on the current debt ratios. 
Given the relevance of this channel, the credibility of the medium-term fiscal targets is chiefly 
influenced by the consolidation of current budget balances. Such a consolidation, on the other 
hand, may eventually be procyclical in coincidence with the large slumps of the economy in the 
present.  By  contrast,  the  new  MTO  formulation  gives  less  incentive  to  undertake  structural 
reforms which may contain the projected increase in age-related expenditure and reduce non-
contractual future spending commitments without necessarily adjusting current budget balances.  
  




Furthermore, by analysing what reported in 2009 SCPs, the paper showed that, due to 
the impact of the crisis, EU Member States reacted either delaying the date of achievement of 
MTOs or even not declaring them. In this respect, the new MTOs methodology appears as 
being quite sensitive to the impact of current crisis, determining tighter targets which  would 
require additional budgetary efforts on top of the ones already planned by governments. This 
could reduce governments‟ incentives in committing towards too ambitious objectives over the 
medium  term  horizon,  leading  to  a  reduced  political  ownership  of  this  rule  and  eventually 
undermining fiscal discipline.    
 
On the basis of debt and GDP growth projections, the paper also proved that the new 
MTO  methodology  would  result  in  more  restrictive  targets  at  the  moment  of  their  revision 
scheduled for 2012.   
 
Finally, the introduction of the fiscal and financial exposure indicator in the algorithm for 
computing  minimum  budgetary  targets  shows  that,  in  times  of  crisis,  countries  with  large 
domestic  and/or  external  imbalances  may  be  called  for  to  set  fiscal  targets  much  more 
ambitious  than  those  determined  on  the  sole  basis  of  the  current  debt-to-GDP  ratio. 
Notwithstanding the relevance of these results, it has also to be highlighted that our findings 
should be interpreted with caution. First of all, they are still subject to large uncertainty as the 
exposure  indicator  is  heavily  influenced  by  the  variables  chosen  to  perform  the  ranking  of 
countries. Secondly, even on the basis of a common set of initial variables, the relative position 
of  a  country  could  vary  according  to  the  modalities  chosen  to  group  the  sub-indicators 
considered in the construction of the exposure index. Given these constraints, the exposure 
index metric should be considered as a preliminary attempt aimed at introducing in the current 
policy debate two important issues: the impact of current explicit liabilities on the determinants 
of fiscal targets; and the role of domestic and external imbalances for the conduct of efficient 
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